After UDI in November 1965 Wilson was unsure on how to proceed. He faced pressure in the United Nations to quash the rebellion by military intervention. However at home the Conservative leader, Edward Heath, demanded assurances that he would not use force. A resolution by the UN General Assembly hinted at the use of force when it called on Britain to “take all necessary steps to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Salisbury.”[1]
Wilson was caught in a difficult situation. There were logistical problems regarding the use of force. Rhodesia was a land-locked country which possessed a powerful military force inherited from the Central African Federation. British troops were also heavily involved in Europe and Malaysia, meaning that a military operation in Rhodesia could dangerously stretch Britain’s forces. Wilson was also concerned that any military action could escalate, with South Africa fighting for the Rhodesians.
This was something which he acknowledged at the 1965 Commonwealth Conference when he said that the use of force “could plunge Africa into armed conflict going far beyond the borders of Rhodesia.”[2] However Arthur Bottomley and Cledwyn Hughes, Foreign and Commonwealth ministers, later stated that they did not think that South Africa would have become involved as they seemed to have operated a cautious policy of ‘wait and see’. However Wilson could not be sure of this. The most often discussed argument against the use of force surrounds the ‘kith and kin’ factor. There was a fear that British forces would refuse to fight against white men who had fought alongside them in World War II. However this ignored the fact that the majority of Rhodesian soldiers in the Second World War were African, but many Rhodesian troops were actually British subjects. The Smith government was also concerned that this might happen to them, so much so that they obtained the resignation of Major General Anderson, the General Officer Commanding Rhodesia as he was known to have opposed UDI. There is no real evidence to suggest that British troops would have refused to fight. However it was a real concern on both sides. Possible domestic unpopularity of using force may also explain Wilson’s decision to rule out the use of force, his slim majority in 1965 meant that a General Election was not far away. Any use of force could jeopardise re-election hopes. However in 1968, a Gallup Poll revealed that 41% of those questioned felt that Britain had failed to deal strongly enough with Rhodesia. Wilson may also have been dissuaded from using force as it could possibly have had a bad effect on the already difficult position of the pound. Wilson remembered only too well the failed Suez invasion after the collapse of the pound. Whilst all the signs may have led Wilson to discount using force, he made a huge mistake by stating this publicly before UDI. In a broadcast before November 1965 he said to “those . . . thinking in terms of a thunderbolt . . . in the shape of the RAF . . . let me say that this will not be coming.”[3] This public admital that he did not intend to use force only served to boost Smith’s confidence in proceeding with UDI preparations. It is unclear if the Rhodesians would have gone ahead with UDI had Wilson threatened to use force to quash it. The evidence of Kenneth Flower would seem to suggest that after Wilson told Smith force would not be used, Smith was boosted in confidence for UDI. Flower had previously advised Smith that the only real concern regarding UDI would be that the Rhodesians would find it difficult to fight of any British military action. Flower suggests that had Wilson threatened to send troops, even if he did not intend, to restore British order, Smith may have backed down. Defence Secretary at the time, Denis Healey, echoes this when he said that “it was insane . . . [when] you’ve so few cards in your hand, you mustn’t tell the other side that you have no cards.”[4] Clearly the use of force would have been difficult and politically dangerous, but Wilson made a grave error by publicly stating force would not be used.
[1] UN Security Council Resolution 20204/XX . Quoted in
[2] Wilson, H Labour Government (1971) page 116
[3] Harold Wilson quoted in Flower, Serving Secretly page 51
[4] Flower page 51
Wilson was caught in a difficult situation. There were logistical problems regarding the use of force. Rhodesia was a land-locked country which possessed a powerful military force inherited from the Central African Federation. British troops were also heavily involved in Europe and Malaysia, meaning that a military operation in Rhodesia could dangerously stretch Britain’s forces. Wilson was also concerned that any military action could escalate, with South Africa fighting for the Rhodesians.
This was something which he acknowledged at the 1965 Commonwealth Conference when he said that the use of force “could plunge Africa into armed conflict going far beyond the borders of Rhodesia.”[2] However Arthur Bottomley and Cledwyn Hughes, Foreign and Commonwealth ministers, later stated that they did not think that South Africa would have become involved as they seemed to have operated a cautious policy of ‘wait and see’. However Wilson could not be sure of this. The most often discussed argument against the use of force surrounds the ‘kith and kin’ factor. There was a fear that British forces would refuse to fight against white men who had fought alongside them in World War II. However this ignored the fact that the majority of Rhodesian soldiers in the Second World War were African, but many Rhodesian troops were actually British subjects. The Smith government was also concerned that this might happen to them, so much so that they obtained the resignation of Major General Anderson, the General Officer Commanding Rhodesia as he was known to have opposed UDI. There is no real evidence to suggest that British troops would have refused to fight. However it was a real concern on both sides. Possible domestic unpopularity of using force may also explain Wilson’s decision to rule out the use of force, his slim majority in 1965 meant that a General Election was not far away. Any use of force could jeopardise re-election hopes. However in 1968, a Gallup Poll revealed that 41% of those questioned felt that Britain had failed to deal strongly enough with Rhodesia. Wilson may also have been dissuaded from using force as it could possibly have had a bad effect on the already difficult position of the pound. Wilson remembered only too well the failed Suez invasion after the collapse of the pound. Whilst all the signs may have led Wilson to discount using force, he made a huge mistake by stating this publicly before UDI. In a broadcast before November 1965 he said to “those . . . thinking in terms of a thunderbolt . . . in the shape of the RAF . . . let me say that this will not be coming.”[3] This public admital that he did not intend to use force only served to boost Smith’s confidence in proceeding with UDI preparations. It is unclear if the Rhodesians would have gone ahead with UDI had Wilson threatened to use force to quash it. The evidence of Kenneth Flower would seem to suggest that after Wilson told Smith force would not be used, Smith was boosted in confidence for UDI. Flower had previously advised Smith that the only real concern regarding UDI would be that the Rhodesians would find it difficult to fight of any British military action. Flower suggests that had Wilson threatened to send troops, even if he did not intend, to restore British order, Smith may have backed down. Defence Secretary at the time, Denis Healey, echoes this when he said that “it was insane . . . [when] you’ve so few cards in your hand, you mustn’t tell the other side that you have no cards.”[4] Clearly the use of force would have been difficult and politically dangerous, but Wilson made a grave error by publicly stating force would not be used.
[1] UN Security Council Resolution 20204/XX . Quoted in
[2] Wilson, H Labour Government (1971) page 116
[3] Harold Wilson quoted in Flower, Serving Secretly page 51
[4] Flower page 51